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IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING IMPROPER




In recent years, several decisions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court sitting
as the Law Court have addressed the comments of prosecutors in final argument
before criminal juries. Three of those decisions in particular1 have caused concern
among prosecutors and have stirred discussion in the Maine legal community.2 In
vacating convictions in State v. Steen, State v. Casella, and State v. Tripp, the Law
Court focused on the language used by the prosecutors during closing argument
and concluded that those prosecutors impermissibly expressed personal opinion
concerning the credibility of the defendants, or witnesses called by the defendants. 3
This Article examines the decisional law of Maine in dealing with improper
prosecutorial closing argument in the context of Steen, Casella, and Tripp. What
the court has identified in those cases as prosecutorial misconduct in the closing
argument is the expression of personal opinion by the prosecutor on the credibility
of the defendant, 4 or a witness for the defendant.5 The characterization of the
closing argument as personal opinion is based on language used by prosecutors,
frequently the use of pejorative language that the court found to be insufficiently
connected to and justified by the evidence. A review of how the court has applied
the law in this area reveals that, except in a few of its opinions, particularly Casella,
and a 1983 case, State v. Smith,6 when emphasis was placed on the pejorative
language used by the prosecutors without full consideration of the context in which
the language was used,7 the court has correctly addressed the cases that have come
before it.8
* The Honorable Robert W. Clifford is an Associate Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court.
1. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993); State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121 (Me. 1993); State
v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994).
2. See James W. Gunson, Comment, Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Betveen
"Personal Opinion " and Proper Argument? 46 ME. L. REv. 241 (1994).
3. See State v. Steen, 623 A.2d at 149; State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 122-23; State v. Tripp, 634
A.2d at 1321.
4. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 122-23; State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1321.
5. See State v. Steen, 623 A.2d at 149. Comments on the credibility of a witness for the State
also may be improper. See State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 10 (1994).
6. 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983).
7. In both Casella and Smith, the prosecutors referred to the defendants as liars. More careful
use of language by the prosecutors, and a more proactive trial court could have avoided the
allegations of misconduct. See infra note 88.
8. In State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994), the court vacated the conviction by conclud-
ing that the prosecutor's misconduct constituted obvious error. See id. at 1320; see also id. at
1321 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Although the court's application of the obvious error standard in
Tripp has been criticized, see Gunson, supra note 2, the improper application of obvious error
generally has not been a recurring or persistent problem in dealing with alleged prosecutorial
misconduct. Accordingly, this paper does not address the standard of obvious error in any de-
tail. See infra notes 61 and 120.
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The rationale for the limits imposed on what prosecutors are permitted to say
in closing argument is related to the roles of the participants in a criminal trial,
especially the unique factfinding role of the jury, and the prominence and the pres-
tige associated with the prosecutor's office, which in Maine is the office of the
DistrictAttorney 9 or Attorney General. 10 By expressing a personal opinion on the
credibility of a witness in closing argument, an attorney is usurping the jury's role
as the factfinder, and diverting the attention of the jury from determining the guilt
or innocence of the defendant based on the evidence.11 The rule has particular
application to prosecutors "because of the possibility that the jury will give special
weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only because of the prestige associated
with the prosecutor's office, but also because of the fact-finding facilities presum-
ably available to the office. ' 12
The proper standard for prosecutorial summation is set out in Berger v. United
States13 and is well known. A prosecutor
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor, indeed he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful convic-
tion as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 14
Maine's Law Court long ago expressed a similar standard. "As is permitted to the
debater in parliamentary contests the legal advocate may employ wit, satire, invec-
tive, and imaginative illustration in his arguments before the jury, both in civil and
criminal trials, but in this the license is strictly confined to the domain of facts in
evidence." 15 The court reiterated this standard more recently:
In arguing the State's case to the jury, a prosecutor may use "wit, satire, invective
and imaginative illustration."... Nevertheless, "the prosecutor should refrain
from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the
evidence, in injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused
under the prevailing law... The prosecutor must limit his argument to the facts
in evidence.... He must avoid prejudicial misstatements of the law ... Further,
the prosecutor must not demean legitimate defenses available under the law...." 1 6
There appears to be little disagreement over what the standard is. The difficulty is
in applying the standard to individual cases, distinguishing proper closing argu-
ment from improper personal opinion, and determining what language means in
9 See 30-A M.R.S.A. §§ 251-289 (1996).
10. See M. CONST. ART. IX, § 11; 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 191, 196, 199.200-A (1989).
11. See State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231, 237 (Me. 1984); State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1129
(Me. 1982). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Limiting Closing Arguments About Evidence. 11
Cmi. JusT., Spring 1996, at 44 (prosecutor's telling jury who to believe interferes with jury's
role to decide facts of the case).
12 A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRMIINAL JusncE 3-5.8 commentary (Prosecutorial function). See
also DisoRiER iN THE CoURT. R.-GULATnNG "hE CONDUcr or -nit PRosacrrolt, Report of the Bar of
the City of New York, Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct, 185 (1973). See also State v.
Comer, 644 A.2d 7,9 (Me. 1974) (prosecutor cloaked with the authority of the State); see infra.
pp. 258-64.
13. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
14. Id. at 88.
15. State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 66, 68 A. 454, 455 (1907).
16. State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231,237 (Me. 1984) (citations omitted).
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the context of the case in which it is used. "Each case, however, must be examined
on its own facts." 17
The impermissible conduct, the "foul blow," most often identified by the Law
Court is the prosecutor's attacking the credibility of the defendant, 18 or a witness
for the defendant, 19 or vouching for the credibility of a witness for the State.2 0
Review of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct by an appellate court is diffi-
cult. Action at the trial court level by the participants at the trial is significantly
more effective in preventing, controlling, and correcting such misconduct. In par-
ticular, prosecutors can almost always avoid allegations of misconduct by arguing
for the jury to reach only those conclusions justified by the evidence; by linking
comments or witness credibility to facts in the evidence; and by avoiding the use
of language that can be characterized as personal opinion or as attacks on the char-
acter of witnesses. Defense attorneys play an important role in policing the con-
duct of prosecutors by objecting to improper closing argument by the State so that
the prejudice may be cured by the trial court. Unlike an appellate court, the trial
court can identify improper summation as it occurs and take immediate and effec-
tive action to correct the damage caused by that summation.
Hl. RECENT CASES FOCUSED ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT
Within a nine-month period during 1993 and 1994, the Law Court vacated
three convictions on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.2 1 In each of those
cases, the comments made by the prosecuting attorney during closing argument
were cited in part as the reason for the convictions being vacated. The opinions in
those cases resulted in a critical comment in the Maine Law Review,22 and caused
legitimate concern in the prosecutorial community.23 When reviewed in the con-
text of prosecutorial misconduct cases that preceded them, however, and with the
more recent opinions in which prosecutorial misconduct has been alleged, Steen,
Casella, and Tripp do not lead to the conclusion that Maine prosecutors are pre-
vented from arguing in an effective manner.
A. State v. Steen
In State v. Steen,24 Steen was charged with gross sexual assault after an inci-
dent that occurred at a college fraternity party in Gorham. The only two witnesses
to the event were Steen and the victim. Steen did not deny that there was sexual
contact; instead his defense was that the sexual conduct was consensual. Accord-
17. Id. (citing State v. Dana, 406 A.2d 83, 88 (Me. 1979)).
18. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 123 (Me. 1993); State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me.
1983).
19. See State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 149 (Me. 1993).
20. See State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 10 (Me. 1994). See also Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 44.
21. See State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994); State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121 (Me. 1993);
State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
22. See Gunson, note 2.
23. See id. at 242, n.15.
24. 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
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ing to the investigating detective, Steen made several inculpatory statements dur-
ing the initial interview.25 Following a conviction after ajury trial, Steen appealed
on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.26 The court characterized the closing
argument as improper, but the State's cross-examination of the defendant was con-
duct far more egregious. The prosecutor asked Steen twenty-four questions re-
quiring him to give an opinion as to whether other witnesses were lying.27 Al-
though Steen objected to the questions several times, the trial court sustained only
one of the objections. During her closing argument, the prosecutor denigrated the
testimony of Steen's medical expert.2 8
The Law Court vacated the conviction based on the prosecutor's conduct. The
court noted that questions forcing a defendant to judge the credibility of other
witnesses impermissibly invade the province of the jury to make that determina-
tion itself. 29 The court, citing State v. Snith,3 0 also concluded that the prosecutor's
cross-examination of Steen and her closing argument were suggestions to the jury
that the defendant lied on the stand.3 1 The court's decision was unanimous.3 2
The most pervasive prosecutorial misconduct in Steen, and the conduct most
responsible for the decision to vacate, was the continued questioning of Steen,
over his objection, as to whether other witnesses, whose testimony differed from
Steen's, were lying. Because such questions create the impression that the jury
could believe the defendant only if the jury found another witness lied, and be-
cause credibility evaluation is for the jury,3 3 they are improper and the court was
following clear precedent in concluding that the trial court erred in allowing those
questions and that the error was harmful. 34
Similar questioning by the prosecutor during his cross-examination of the de-
fendant was an important factor in the decision to vacate the conviction in State v.
25. See id. at 148.
26. See id.
27. See id. n.2. The following questions were among those asked of Steen by the prosecutor.
Q. I want you to tell me which statements you say really happened and which state-
ments you're saying detective Brown is lying about.
Q. Well, are you saying that everything [the victim] said to this jury is a lie?
Q. And everyone else who testified in this courtroom all week long was lying?
The prosecutor also asked Steen: "So you made this one up on your own?" and "So now we
have three versions .... It is hard for you to keep this all straight, isn't it?" Id. at 149.
28. See hi. at 149. In her closing argument, the prosecutor said: "so [Steen's medical expert's]
opinion is not based on his clinical expertise, his opinion is not based on his education, his
opinion is not based on studies that he has conducted or studies he has read. I suggest to you,
ladies and gentlemen that his opinion [that the vaginal tear of the victim was not big enough for
it to have been caused by rape] is based on $2,500, the money the defendant paid him for his
testimony." Id.
29. See id. at 148-49. See State v. Commeau, 409 A.2d 247, 249 n.l (Me. 1974) (cross-
examination that attempts to push defendant into saying other witnesses lied is improper); State
v. Bourgeois, 639 A.2d 634, 638 (Me. 1994). But see State v. Goodwin, 1997 M.E 69, 1 5-6,
691 A.2d 1246, 1247-48 (permissible in cross examination to identify and highlight differences
between testimony of defendant and that of other witnesses if pertaining to questions of fact and
not opinion).
30. 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983). See infra pp. 250-51.
31. See State v. Steen, 623 A.2d at 149.
32. See id. at 150.
33. See State v. Goodwin, 1997 ME 69, 1 5, 691 A.2d 1246, 1247.
34. See State v. Commeau, 409 A.2d 247, 249 n.l (Me. 1979).
Tripp, that followed soon after Steen.3 5 Moreover, in three subsequent decisions
rejecting challenges to the conduct of the prosecutor in closing argument, the court
noted the absence of questions asked of the defendant that "compelled" him to
accuse a witness of lying.36 The Law Court has recently pointed out that it is
permissible to "ascertain specifically areas in which the defendant disagrees with
other witnesses, if such questioning calls for a statement of fact rather than of
opinion. Differences in testimony can be identified without asking the defendant's
opinion whether the other witnesses were incorrect, mistaken, inaccurate, or suf-
fered poor memory." 37
In retrospect, the prosecutor's suggestion to the jury that the testimony of
Steen's expert was influenced by the $2,500 fee he was paid seems significantly
less egregious than the questions asked of the defendant on cross-examination.
That Steen's conviction would have been vacated if the only issue on appeal were
the prosecutor's summation is doubtful. More careful use of language by the pros-
ecutor, however, such as inviting the jury, in view of the evidence from the other
expert witnesses, and the testimony of the victim, to consider whether the testi-
mony of Steen's expert may have been influenced by the $2,500 fee, could have
avoided an issue on appeal.
B. State v. Casella
In State v. Casella,38 a four-member majority of the court vacated the
defendant's convictions of four counts of theft and one count of witness tampering
on the basis that the prosecutor, by repeatedly asserting in his closing argument
that Casella had lied, had impermissibly expressed a personal opinion that the
defendant had lied.3 9 The charges against Casella stemmed from the failure to
return down payments to customers and the failure to deliver to them a machine
that he had represented that his company manufactured and sold.40 During the
closing argument, the prosecutor stated forty-one times that Casella had lied. 4 1
Casella's counsel objected and unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial.42 Despite the
prosecutor's contention that deception on the part of Casella was the issue in the
case, and that therefore his summation was based on the evidence and fully justi-
fied, the four justice majority disagreed:
The fact that the charges are based on deception does not mean that the prosecu-
tor is therefore free to express his personal opinion that the defendant was lying
in court. A rule allowing the prosecutor to express his opinion on the credibility
of the defendant's testimony in cases where the defendant's veracity is central to
the prosecution has no precedent in our jurisprudence. 4 3
35. See State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1320 (Me. 1994).
36. See State v. Corrieri, 654 A.2d 419,422 (Me. 1995); State v. Moontri, 649 A.2d 315, 317
(Me. 1994); State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 10 (Me. 1994).
37. State v. Goodwin, 691 A.2d at 1248.
38. 632 A.2d 121 (Me. 1993).
39. See id. at 122.
40. See id. at 121.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 122.
43. Id. at 123.
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Three members of the court dissented.4 4 The dissent agreed that prosecutors
should be prohibited from expressing a personal opinion on the credibility of the
defendant.45 The dissent, however, concluded that the State's closing argument,
when examined in its entirety and in the context of the nature of the charges against
Casella, and Casella's defenses to those charges, was fairly based on the facts in
evidence and that the vigor and zeal expressed in the State's summation was per-
missible.
The central thrust of the State's case was that Casella cheated the victims out of
their money, and that he operated his business on the basic principle that he would
say anything, do anything, and tell any lie to get their money. The evidence
presented at trial demonstrated Casella's elaborate scheme of defrauding his cus-
tomers by making false promises and keeping their money without authorization.
Casella himself took the stand, denied lying to the victims, and directly contra-
dicted the State's witnesses and evidence by stating that the charges brought against
him merely involved simple business disputes. By equating the theory of Casella's
defense with the same principles that he exhibited in his business, and inviting
the jury's comparison, the State's argument taken in full context does not amount
to an expression of personal opinion as to Casella's credibility.46
Even though the defendant's veracity was the central and, indeed, the only real
issue during the trial, the majority viewed the prosecutor's characterizations as
personal opinion and overturned the conviction.4 7
Because the prosecutors are "cloaked with the authority of the State,"4 8 they
must choose their words in a closing argument with great care. Statements that a
defendant is a "liar," or is "guilty," or that a State's witness is "truthful," without
directly connecting those statements to evidence before the jury, are likely to be
characterized by an appellate court as personal opinion. 49 In Casella, language
such as "I submit that the defendant's testimony is not credible," or "the evidence
clearly demonstrates that the defendant's testimony is not truthful," if linked to the
evidence, would be permissible.5 0
C. State v. Tripp
State v. Tripp51 involved a father's appeal from his conviction on three counts 52
of gross sexual assault against his son. During the State's cross-examination of
Tripp, the prosecutor, as the prosecutor did in State v. Steen, asked the defendant
44. See id. at 124. The dissent, written by Justice Rudman, was joined by Chief Justice
Wathen and Justice Clifford, the author of this paper. See id. at 124.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 124.
47. Id. at 123.
48. State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me. 1994).
49. See State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1129 n.2 (Me. 1982) (noting use of pejorative lan-
guage such as "liar" not condoned). See also State v. Tripp. 634 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Me. 1994);
State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 123 (Me. 1993); State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16. 17 (Me. 1983).
50. See Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 44. See also discussion infra pp. 263-64.
51. 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994).
52. Tripp was acquitted on three additional counts of gross sexual misconduct at his trial. See
iM at 1319.
several questions that required him to answer whether his son was lying.53 Tripp
did not object to the questions.5 5 During closing argument, the prosecutor argued
that the child victim would not lie about the details he related, and that either the
victim or the defendant "wasn't telling the truth. One of them was lying here to all
of us. ' 5 5 Again, the defendant did not object to the State's closing argument. 56
Despite the failure of Tripp's counsel to preserve any objection to the method
of cross-examination or the substance of the closing argument, the Law Court va-
cated Tripp's conviction. The court concluded that the State's cross-examination
of Tripp amounted to obvious error,57 and that the statements in the prosecutor's
closing argument constituted obvious error as well.5 8 The court stated that be-
cause the jury had heard both the victim and defendant testify the jury was in a
position to make its own determination of the credibility of the witnesses in draw-
ing its conclusions. 59
The dissent agreed that some of the questions asked by the State constituted
error,60 but pointed out that Tripp's own attorney, in his summation, had said to the
jury that "either... [the victim] or [Tripp] is lying. Either the assaults occurred or
they didn't. '61 The dissent concluded that, viewing the record in its entirety, the
errors in the State's cross-examination and the closing argument of the prosecutor
did not amount to obvious error.62
As was the case in Steen, the improper cross-examination of the defendant by
the prosecutor was the conduct most probably responsible for the conviction being
vacated. The court would probably not have concluded that the summation alone,
in the absence of the improper cross-examination of the defendant constituted ob-
vious error. In three subsequent cases,6 3 decided not long after Steen and Tripp,
the court noted the absence of improper questions to the defendant regarding
credibility of other witnesses in concluding that there was no obvious error by the
prosecutor in the closing argument.6 4
The opinions in Steen, Casella, and Tripp received criticism from the bar,
especially from prosecutors, and ultimately generated a well-written comment
published in the Maine Law Review.65 That comment was critical of the opinions
53. See id. nn. 2-4. See also State v. Commeau, 409 A.2d 247, 249 n.j (Me. 1979); State v.
Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 148-49 (Me. 1993).
54. See State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1319.
55. See id. at 1319-20 n.5.
56. See id. at 1319-20.
57. See id. at 1320.
58. See id. at 1321. It appears that the prosecutor's closing argument in Tripp is not markedly
different from the closing argument used by the prosecutor in State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17
(Me. 1983). See discussion infra at pp. 250-51. Based on the opinion in Tripp and on opinions
in three cases since Tripp, it is clear that improper cross-examination questions of Tripp played
a major role in the court's conclusion that the State's summation was obvious error. See supra
note 35 and infra note 62.
59. See State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1320.
60. See id. at 1321 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
61. See id. (Clifford, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
62. See id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
63. See State v. Corrieri, 654 A.2d 419,422 (Me. 1995); State v. Moontri, 649 A.2d 315, 316-
17 (Me. 1994); State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 10 (Me. 1994).
64. See supra note 8 and infra notes 67 and 134.
65. See Gunson, supra note 2.
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in Steen, Casella, and Tripp for failing to distinguish between proper argument
based on the evidence in the record and the prosecutor's personal opinion, for
focusing exclusively on the conduct of the prosecutor without analyzing the effect
of that conduct on the deliberations of the jury,66 and, in Tripp, for redefining the
standard for obvious error.67 The comment also prophetically suggested that these
cases would lead to an increased number of appeals raising the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct. 6 8
III. PRIOR CASE LAW
Steen, Casella, and Tripp, however, were not the first cases dealing with the
appropriateness of prosecutorial summation. Relatively few of those cases de-
cided prior to Steen resulted in convictions being vacated. In State st McDonald,69
the conviction was vacated because the State, in its closing, impermissibly deni-
grated the defense of insanity.7 0 In State v. Pineau7 1 the Law Court vacated Pineau's
conviction because in the State's closing, the prosecutor injected fear into an oper-
ating under the influence case by asking jurors to imagine being on the road at the
same time as the defendant. 72
In State v. Reilly,7 3 Reilly's conviction for assault on an officer was vacated
based on an improper closing argument by the prosecutor. In his closing, the pros-
ecutor stated that the defense attorney had conceded that the police were telling the
truth when no such concession had been made, that defense counsel knew the
police were truthful, and that they knew the defendant was lying. 4 The court
characterized the State's summation as "prosecutorial overkill," and a violation of
M. Bar R. 3.7(e).75 and vacated the conviction even though the defense had made
no objection to the closing at the trial. 6 The court commented that the prosecutor
"clearly stepped across" the "line between proper and improper behavior," a line
the prosecutor should "stay a safe distance away from" if he "cannot discern [it]
with confidence. ' 77 The Reilly court noted "we do not condone the use of
pejoratives such as 'liar.' 7 8
66. See id. at 242,243,265-66,270,272,275-77,281-82.
67. See id. at 277,279,281. See State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1320 (quoting State v. True, 438
A.2d 460,467 (Me. 1981) and using a definition of obvious error, as a determination "whether
the obviousness of the error and the seriousness of the injustice done to the defendant thereby
are so great the Law Court cannot in good conscience let the conviction stand."). See also supra
notes 8 and 63 and infra note 133.
68. See Gunson, supra note 2, at 282.
69. 472 A.2d 424 (Me. 1984).
70. See id. at 425-26.
71. 463 A.2d 779 (Me. 1983).
72. Seeid. at 780-81.
73. 446 A.2d 1125 (Me. 1982).
74. See id. at 1128.
75. Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e) governs the conduct of attorneys appearing in a professional
capacity before a tribunal. See infra note 187.
76. See State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d at 1128-29.
77. Id. at 1129 (citations omitted).
78. Il. at 1129 n.2. Although there are cases when such references have been deemed to be
permissible, see State v. Hamish, 560 A.2d 5, 9 (Me. 1989); State v. Pendexter, 495 A.2d 1241
(Me. 1985), generally, however, the Law Court has not been tolerant of the pejorative use of the
word"liar." See State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Me. 1994); State v. Casella. 632 A2d 121,
122-24 (Me. 1993); State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1983).
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In 1983, in State v. Smith,79 the court again invoked prosecutorial misconduct
to vacate a conviction. Smith was charged with assault against a teacher and a
security guard at a boarding school in Bethel. The jury acquitted Smith of assault
on the security guard, but found him guilty of attacking the teacher, who was act-
ing as a supervisor.80 Smith's appeal was based on what he contended were preju-
dicial comments that the prosecutor made in closing argument.8 1
In the closing, when commenting on some of the defendant's testimony and a
prior inconsistent statement, the prosecutor stated, "'He [defendant] gets caught
lying and he can't even admit it.' 82 In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that "'[y]ou
people are smarter than that, to let him [defendant] come in here and tell you he
was telling the truth because he wasn't.' 83 Defense counsel did not object to
either of these statements. 84 The statement to which defense counsel did object
was made by the prosecutor in finishing his rebuttal. 85 He stated that the jury
should hold the defendant responsible for what he did or "'you tell him it's okay to
lie.' 86 Smith's counsel objected to the State's closing comment, asked for a cor-
rective instruction, and moved for a mistrial after the court had instructed the jury.87
The trial court denied the motion and concluded that the argument was legitimate. 88
On appeal the Law Court disagreed and vacated the conviction based on
prosecutorial misconduct.8 9 The court noted that "[t]he trial essentially pitted
Smith's credibility against that of [the teacher] and [the security guard]" 90 and
concluded that the prosecutor's remark was "conveying his opinion that Smith had
lied and was therefore guilty."9 1 Stating the law correctly, the court noted that
"[a]lthough the prosecutor may properly attack defendant's credibility by analyz-
ing the evidence and highlighting absurdities or discrepancies in defendant's testi-
79. 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983).
80. See id. at 17.
81. See id. at 16-17.






88. See id. As the trial judge in Smith, I readily concede that the trial court should have
addressed Smith's motion in a different manner. One can argue with the conclusion of the Law
Court in Smith that the prosecutor's summation was the expression of a personal opinion not
based on the evidence. Nevertheless, in view of the objection made, the jury should have been
reinstructed that the argument of the prosecutor was not evidence, and that the jury should assess
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses on its own, based on the evidence. If such an
instruction or a similar instruction had been given in response to the objection, the result of the
appeal most likely would have been different. See State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1129 (Me.
1982) (prompt and appropriate curative instruction may well alleviate damage caused by very
egregious conduct of prosecution); see discussion infra pp. 14016, (discussing the role of the
trial court and the importance of curative instructions). Moreover, the prosecutor would have
been well advised to use more care in his choice of words to couch his references to the defendant's
credibility with words like "I submit" or "I suggest that the evidence shows," and to specifically
connect the comments on credibility to the evidence. See discussion infra, pp. 263-64, (discussing
careful use of language by prosecutors).
89. State v. Smith, 456 A.2d at 19.
90. Id. at 17 (alteration in original).
91. Id.
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mony, and may present his analysis in summation with vigor and zeal, he may not
properly convey to the jury his personal opinion that a defendant is lying." 92 The
court emphasized the special role of the prosecutor and that "[h]is remarks are
those, not simply of an advocate, but rather of a [government] official duty-bound
to see that justice is done." 93 The court concluded that the trial court's refusal to
give a corrective instruction after the reading of thejury instructions was an abuse
of discretion.94
The Law Court, in its analysis of whether the error was harmless, noted that
"[the credibility of the participants in the fight was crucial, and the prosecutor's
improper remarks went directly to that issue.' 95 That the prosecutor's closing
statement goes directly to credibility, however, should not alone make it improper.
The issue should be whether the closing is based on and justified by the evidence.
In Smith, the prosecutor's remarks appear to have been grounded in the evidence.
Smith's own testimony, as well as other evidence, demonstrated his reputation for
untruthfulness. Smith had recounted a different version of the assault under oath
prior to the trial, and other witnesses testified that Smith told a different story on
the night of the incident.96 Smith's counsel voiced no objection to the State's
closing until after the jury instructions and the jury was about to retire to begin
deliberations. 97 Although the prosecutor's language did not always directly con-
nect Smith's credibility to the evidence, and he would have been well advised to
use language such as "the evidence shows that Smith is lying," or "I suggest to
you, that based on the evidence in this case, the defendant did not tell the truth, and
if you do not find him guilty, you are telling him that it's okay," the prosecutor did
not clearly convey that he had a personal opinion as to Smith's credibility. He
never said that he "believed" that Smith was lying. Smith was charged with a
crime of violence not involving trickery and deception, and the credibility of the
witnesses was central to the case. The court's decision is based on its conclusion
that the prosecutor was impermissibly expressing an opinion on the defendant's
credibility. Unfortunately, the opinion does not address the extent to which the
prosecutor's comments in his summation may be justified by the evidence in the
case, and the court comes close to applying a per se rule on the use of the word
"liar."98 Nevertheless, more careful choice of language by the prosecutor cer-
tainly could have avoided the issue on appeal.99
Pre-Steen, Casella, and Tripp appeals based on prosecutorial misconduct, how-
ever, generally did not result in convictions being vacated. In State v. Dana,100 for
92. ld.
93. Id. at 18 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178
(2d Cir. 1981)). See discussion infra pp. 258-64 (discussing unique role of prosecutor).
94. State v. Smith, 456 A.2d at 18. See supra note 79.
95. Id. at 19.
96. See State's brief at 12; State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983).
97. See State v. Smith, 456 A.2d at 18.
98. In State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125 (Me. 1982), in a footnote, the court seems to refer to a
perse rule prohibiting the use of the word "liar." Id. at 1129-30 n.2. But see State v. Harnish,
560 A.2d 5, 9 (Me. 1989); State v. Pendexter, 495 A.2d 1241, 1241 (Me. 1985) (use of word
"liar" in State's closing may be justified by the evidence).
99. See infra pp. 263-64.
100. 406 A.2d 83 (Me. 1979).
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example, the prosecutor's statements in closing argument as to what a jury should
believe were held not to constitute error, 10 1 and reference to the defendant's race,
because it was inadvertent, did not rise to the level of obvious error. 102
In State v. Vigue, 10 3 the prosecutor's reference to his own expertise and train-
ing in law enforcement was improper, but did not amount to obvious error. 104 In
State v. Terrio,105 the prosecutor improperly alluded to statements that were not in
evidence, but it was not error for the trial court not to order, sua sponte, a mistrial,
when defense counsel failed to object and adamantly refused a curative instruction
suggested by the court. 106 In State v. Johnson,1 07 a prosecutor's remark in closing
argument that of three versions of the event before the jury, not all could be true,
was not error. 10 8
In State v. Hinds,10 9 in his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to charges
against the defendant as "nasty stuff," characterized a defense witness as "a very
street-smart, intelligent, good-looking young man," and referred to the prosecu-
tion against the defendant as "this kind of show."11 0 In upholding the conviction,
the Law Court stated that a "court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends
an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less dam-
aging interpretations."11 1 In addition, the prosecutor told the jury that if it be-
lieved the complainant, it should convict the defendant, and that if it did not be-
lieve the testimony, it should find the defendant not guilty.112 The court also re-
jected the defendant's argument that the prosecutor's remarks oversimplified the
jury's duty and misstated the burden of proof.113
In State v. Dube,114 a statement by the prosecutor that "I think [the State's
witness] is a very good witness," although an improper assertion of the prosecutor's
personal opinion, was held not to constitute obvious error.115 Statements in the
State's closing argument that the police had done good work in their investigation
likewise did not rise to the level of obvious error in State v. Niemszyk. 116 In his
closing statement in State v. Tomah,117 the prosecutor told the jury that he believed
the police testified professionally, that the tracking dog did a good job, that people
do not forget the names of people with whom they served in the military, that his
questioning of the defendant had "stretched defendant's credibility to the breaking
101. See id. at 86.
102. See id.
103. 420 A.2d 242 (Me. 1980).
104. See id at 246-47.
105. 442 A.2d 537 (Me. 1982).
106. See id. at 540-43.
107. 472 A.2d 1367 (Me. 1984).
108. See id. at 1373.
109. 485 A.2d 231 (Me. 1984).
110. Id at 237.
111. Id. at 238 (quoting State v. Gordon, 321 A.2d 352, 364 (Me. 1974)).
112. See id. at 238.
113. Seeid.
114. 522 A.2d 904 (Me. 1987).
115. Id. at 908.
116. 551 A.2d 842, 844 (Me. 1988).
117. 586 A.2d 1267 (Me. 1991).
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A brief overview of those cases gives us a better understanding of where the
court locates the line between proper argument and improper personal opinion. In
State v. Comer,12 9 the defendant was convicted of five counts of gross sexual mis-
conduct and five counts of unlawful sexual contact. 130 The victim was the young
son of the defendant's girlfriend. After accusing the defendant of sexual miscon-
duct, the victim later retracted the accusation before testifying at the trial that the
abuse occurred. 13 1 Comer contended on appeal that the prosecutor had improp-
erly commented on the veracity of the victim during the prosecutor's final argu-
ment. The prosecutor "suggested" to the jury that the victim "told you the truth,"
that the victim's testimony is "the truth," that the victim "came in here to tell you
the truth," that the victim had no motive to lie, that the jury's role is to seek the
truth and the victim "is giving you what you are seeking and that is the truth." 132
Because Comer never objected to the conduct at trial, the court correctly reviewed
the contention on appeal for obvious error. 133
Faced with a similar procedural situation as in Tripp, the court affirmed the
conviction. The court noted that the case was a close one and reviewed its prior
opinion in Tripp.134 Although the outcome may have been different had the de-
fendant properly objected at trial, the court found no obvious error. The court
noted that the prosecutor did not ask any improper questions regarding witness
credibility,135 nor did he suggest that the defendant, who did not testify, had lied.136
The court noted that:
As the argument progressed, the phrase "from the evidence" was dropped, 137
and the prosecutor came perilously close to replicating the offending argument in
Tripp. We cannot say that this is not error, but reading the entire argument as a
whole, it is reasonable to assume that the jury was not induced to focus on any-
thing other than the evidence. 138
The court described the prosecutor's words as "ill-chosen" but found that Comer,
unlike Tripp, had not been deprived of a fair trial. 13 9 Had the prosecutor contin-
ued to connect his references to the victim's credibility to the evidence, his words
would not have been considered "ill-chosen."
129. 644 A.2d 7 (Me. 1994).
130. See id. at 8.
131. See id.
132. Id. at n.1.
133. See id. at 9. The court described "obvious error" as error "so highly prejudicial that it
taints the proceedings and virtually deprives defendant of a fair trial." Id. at 9 (citing State v.
True, 438 A.2d 460, 468 (Me. 1981)). See also State v. Pelletier, 673 A.2d 1327, 1330 (Me.
1996) (obvious error standard also applies to statements made during opening statement of pros-
ecutor if no objection made). Not surprisingly, vacating a judgment on the basis of obvious
error is exceedingly rare. See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 94 (Me. 1986) (review of obvious
error exercised when effect of inadmissible evidence was "seriously prejudicial error tending to
produce manifest injustice.") (quoting State v. True. 438 A.2d at 469). The Law Court has
correctly applied that standard in cases since State v. Tripp. See supra notes 8 and 67.
134. See State v. Comer, 644 A.2d at 10.
135. See id. See also supra note 34, infra note 143.
136. See U
137. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 44; see also discussion infra Part V.A.
138. State v. Comer, 644 A.2d at 10.
139. See id.
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point," and that "if you sit on a jury for twenty years, you'll never see a more rock
solid case." 118 The court considered the argument improper, but concluded that it
was not obvious error. 119
In two cases the Law Court concluded that references to the defendant or to a
witness as a liar were permissible, because the references were justified by the
evidence. In State v. Pendexter,120 the prosecutor referred to a witness as "an
admitted thief and an admitted liar. ' 12 1 Rejecting Pendexter's contention that the
court should have given a curative instruction or granted a motion for a mistrial,
the court concluded that because the witness freely admitted to stealing a motor
vehicle and lying about it, the comment was fairly based on the evidence. 122 In
State v. Harnish,123 the prosecutor stated that the defendant did not tell the truth,
"suggested" that he reacted with lies, talked about his false statements, asked why
he lied, stated that he made misstatements or lies, and that he did not tell the truth. 124
The Law Court observed that the argument was based on the evidence and noted
that, because Harnish did not request a curative instruction, that the denial of his
motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of the court's discretion. 12 5
A fair reading of the cases prior to Steen, Casella, and Tripp alleging
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument do not reflect an unfair advantage in
favor of defendants, nor do they show that prosecutors were being unduly restricted
in what they could argue to the jury in summation. The opinions in Steen, Casella,
and Tripp apparently caused some concern about the extent to which prosecutors
were still free to vigorously argue in favor of convictions, 126 and resulted in more
challenges on appeal based on alleged misconduct on the part of prosecutors. 127
Most of the challenges were based on an obvious error standard of review,
objections to the closing arguments of the State not having been preserved. They
did not result in any convictions being vacated. 128
IV. POST-TRIPP CASE LAW
Although the Law Court's opinions since Steen, Casella and Tripp have been
critical of some of the language used by prosecutors in closing arguments, fairly
read they say that if prosecutors base closing arguments on the evidence, choose
carefully the language they use, and avoid stating what reasonably can be taken as
personal opinion, they can advocate with zeal and vigor without fear of a just
conviction being vacated.
118. Id. at 1269.
119. See id. at 1269-70. It may be difficult to reconcile the result in State v. Tomah with that
reached by the Court in State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994).
120. 495 A.2d 1241 (Me. 1985).
121. Id. at 1241.
122. See id. Although Pendexter seems inconsistent with language appearing in other cases,
see, e.g., State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1129 n.2 (Me. 1982) ("we do not condone the use of
pejoratives such as 'liar'), nevertheless, the open admission of the witness to lying and to theft
connected the comment of the prosecutor to the evidence and justified the result.
123. 560 A.2d 5 (Me. 1989).
124. See id. at 9.
125. See id. at 10.
126. See Gunson, supra note 2, at 242 n.15.
127. See id. at 282.
128. See infra note 133.
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In State v. Moontri,140 the defendant appealed his conviction for murder, ag-
gravated assault, criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, and assault.14 1
During the closing argument the prosecutor explained inconsistencies between the
testimony of eyewitnesses by suggesting that it was not unusual for witnesses to
have different recollections of the same event. These comments were not objected
to. Although the court noted that the prosecutor used the "unfortunate" and "ill-
chosen" phrase "I think," the court concluded that the State's argument was not
obvious error. 142 Citing Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e)(2)(v), which allows a lawyer, in-
cluding the prosecutor, to argue "for any position or conclusion" grounded in the
evidence, the court concluded that the State's argument was fairly based on the
evidence and did not improperly reflect a personal belief that a witness had lied.
The court described the State's argument as an appeal to common sense and expe-
rience that did not cross the line into prohibited argument. The court concluded
that "[w]hen viewed in context, the State's comment is based on the evidence...
."143 The court correctly viewed the State's closing in the context of the entire
trial and concluded that some use of careless language, such as "I think" (as op-
posed to more carefully selected language such as "the evidence suggests") did not
rise to the level of obvious error.
In State v. Hoffstadt,144 a case involving unlawful sexual contact, the defen-
dant contended on appeal that the State, in its closing argument, improperly com-
mented on the veracity of the victim and the victim's mother.145 Recognizing that
Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e)(2)(v) prohibits all attorneys from expressing personal opin-
ion as to the credibility or truthfulness of a witness and that this rule has particular
application to a prosecutor, the court nevertheless pointed out that the State "is...
not barred from commenting on the fact that witness credibility is a crucial issue in
a case." 146 The court went on:
The central question is whether the comments are fairly based on the facts in
evidence.... The record in this case discloses that the State did not give its
personal opinions as to witness credibility, but rather suggested to the jury that
the testimony of the victim and her mother was properly motivated by truth and
not fabricated because of bias against Hoffstadt, or because the victim wanted to
shift blame for what she was observed doing with another child in the neighbor-
hood. The State pointed toward the inferences that it wanted the jury to draw
from the evidence and argued "[its] analysis of the evidence for [a] ... conclu-
sion [of the defendant's guilt]. ' ' 147
140. 649 A.2d 315 (Me. 1994).
141. See id. at 316-17.
142. See id at 317.
143. Id. The court, as it did in State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 10 (Me. 1994), noted that the State
did not question the defendant concerning the veracity of other witnesses. See State v. Moontri,
649 A.2d at 317; see also State v. Corrieri, 654 A.2d 419, 422 (Me. 1995).
144. 652 A.2d 93 (Me. 1995).
145. See id. at 96. The opinion does not set out in detail the actual language used by the
prosecutor.
146. Id. at 96.
147. Id. at 96-97 (citing ME. BAR R. 3.7(e)(2)(v)); see also State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 41, 1
22,697 A.2d 73,80 (finding that, if summation is based on evidence and inferences that may be
drawn from evidence, it is not error for prosecutors to argue for any position or conclusion in
respect thereto).
In State v. Weisbrode,14 8 the defendant appealed from his conviction for three
counts of unlawful sexual contact. He contended that during the closing argument
the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion on the credibility of the witness
when he stated "[o]r you may end up saying that this 12-year old boy ... told you
this for one reason and one reason only, and that is because it happened." 149 The
court concluded that the statement was not improper because the prosecutor "was
merely advising the jury that it could conclude that the victim was telling the
truth." 150 The court noted that the "[defendant] took the stand and directly contra-
dicted the victim's testimony, turning the trial into a credibility contest." 15 1 The
court then concluded:
The prosecutor's statements did not represent improper personal opinion. The
argument was a reply to a defense strategy that placed the defendant's credibility
in competition with that of the victim; it asked the jury to use its common sense
to assess the credibility of witnesses in light of the testimony given by the victim
and the defendant's vested interest in securing an acquittal. 152
The court also rejected Weisbrode's contention that the comment made during the
final argument that if the victim is making up the story he told, he would "have to
be a sociopathic little devil," was improper. The court said that even though the
prosecutor's comment came close to "divert[ing] the jury from its duty to decide
the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of
the accused under the prevailing law," 153 nevertheless it did not constitute obvious
error.
Prosecutorial misconduct has been alleged in several other post-Tripp cases as
well. None of these allegations have resulted in a conviction being vacated. 154
148. 653 A.2d 411 (Me. 1995).




153. Id. The court noted the absence of evidence that the victim was a sociopath and that that
was not the issue to be decided by the jury.
154. See State v. Stanton, 1998 ME 85, 9 13, 15, 710 A.2d 240,244 (reference by prosecutor
to suffering of victim was legitimate attempt to prod jury to consider victim's motivation in
testifying, and statement attacking defendant's defense were in context, intended to draw atten-
tion to lack of evidence supporting theory of defense). See also State v. Lewis, 1998 ME 83, 'j
7, 711 A.2d 119, 122 (holding that prosecutor's comparison of victim's learning to take respon-
sibility for himself to the defendant who was not taking any responsibility did not constitute an
expression of the prosecutor's personal opinion); State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 41, 122, 697 A.2d
73, 80 (holding that it was not error for State to base summation on facts and testimony in
evidence and reasonable inferences and to argue for any position or conclusion in respect thereto);
State v. Pelletier, 673 A.2d 1327, 1330 (Me. 1996) (alleging improper opening statements, with
part of opening objected to not error, and part of opening statement not objected to not obvious
error); State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 105-06 (Me. 1995) (prosecutor's closing argument not
improper advocacy, but rather forceful but fair comment on the evidence); State v. Bennett, 658
A.2d 1058, 1063 (Me. 1995) (statements in State's closing injecting extraneous matters of fear
into case improper, but failure to grant mistrial within court's discretion when curative instruc-
tion given or offered to be given by court); State v. Corrieri, 654 A.2d 419, 422 (Me. 1995) (no
obvious error in State's closing argument that referred to defense of duress as "bunch of non-
sense"; the court noted, however, the fact that the State did not ask the defendant to comment on
the credibility of other witnesses); State v. Doak, 651 A.2d 342, 344 (Me. 1994) (statements in
State's closing on credibility of state witness not obvious error); State v. Bourgeois, 639 A.2d
634, 638 (Me. 1994) (improper for court to ask defendant if other witnesses lied; conviction,
however, vacated on other grounds).
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Moreover, the court has not misapplied the obvious error standard of review when
prosecutorial misconduct has been alleged. 155 In State r. Comer,156 State n:
Moontri, 15 7 State v. Pelletier, 15 8 State v. Corrieri, 159 and State r. Doak, 160 the
court applied the doctrine of obvious error in an appropriate fashion, concluding in
each case that there was no obvious error. Moreover, the opinions reflect that the
court has looked at the closing statements as well as questions asked by prosecu-
tors alleged to constitute the misconduct in the context of the entire trial and not in
isolation. 16 1 Indeed the opinions in Casella and Smith appear to be unique; they
contain minimal discussion of the evidentiary context in which the language of the
prosecutor in summation deemed to constitute personal opinion is used. In both of
those cases, however, the allegations of misconduct could have been avoided by
better use of language by the prosecutors, 16 2 and by curative action by the trial
court. 16 3
V. THE ROLES OF THE APPELLATE COURT, THE TRIAL COURT, THE PROSECUTOR,
AND THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY IN IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING IMPROPER
ARGUMENT
A. The Appellate Court
Review of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is a
difficult task for an appellate court. The appellate court is removed from the cir-
cumstances of the trial and must assess the closing argument based on the choice
of words actually used by the prosecutor, 164 without the benefit of the "feel" for
the trial gained only through presence at the trial. 16 5 Even if the prosecutor's
intent in closing argument is to suggest to the jury that the evidence justifies an
inference that the testimony of the defendant is not credible, if in fact the prosecu-
tor uses language that could be characterized as the expression of a personal opin-
ion, the appellate court has to deal with the language used. 166 Moreover, when a
defendant does not object to language used in a closing argument, the appellate
court can easily assume that the defendant is satisfied that there is no prejudice
because inaction on the part of the defense counsel may lead to a conclusion by the
155. See supra notes 8, 67, and 133.
156. 644 A.2d 7, 10 (Me. 1994).
157. 649 A.2d 315,317 (Me. 1994).
158. 673 A.2d 1327, 1330 (Me. 1996).
159. 654 A.2d 419,422 (Me. 1995).
160. 651 A.2d 342,344 (Me. 1994).
161. State v. Moontri, 649 A.2d at 317; State v. Hoffstadt, 652 A.2d 93.96 (Me. 1995); State
v. Weisbrode, 653 A.2d 411,416 (Me. 1995); State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 105 (Me. 1995).
162. See infra pp. 263-64.
163. See supra note 88 and infra pp. 265-67.
164. See State v. Pelletier, 534 A.2d 970, 972-73 (Me. 1987) (appellate court must decide
case based on record before it). See also State v. Wheeler, 444 A.2d 430,432 (Me. 1982); State
v. Gribbin, 360 A.2d 517, 518 (Me. 1976).
165. See State v. Wallace, 1997 ME 51, 6, 691 A.2d 1195, 1197 ("appellate court must
depend to a great extent on the trial court's perception of prejudice... and defer generally to the
judgment of the trial court"). See also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
166. See State v. Pelletier, 534 A.2d at 972-73.
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appellate court that the attorney made a tactical decision to waive objection. 167
Moreover, when the trial court, closer to the scene of the trial and with the benefit
of the "feel" for the trial, does not intervene to declare a mistrial or give a curative
instruction, a deferential appellate court is reluctant to vacate a conviction that is
supported by substantial evidence. 16 8
B. The Prosecutor
Appellate court review of appeals based on prosecutorial misconduct is made
more difficult by the unique role of the prosecutor in our criminal justice system.
The actions of the prosecutor are reviewed by an appellate court differently than
conduct of other attorneys. The primary responsibility of the prosecutor is to see
that justice is accomplished, 169 to "protect the innocent as well as convict the
guilty."' 170 The prosecutor "has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply ... an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon
the basis of sufficient evidence." 17 1 The Law Court has said that the prosecutor
represents the community 172 and "an impartial sovereign." 173 He or she "stands
before the jury, cloaked with the authority of the State and is duty-bound to see
that justice is done." 174 Thus because of that unique position of authority, the
words used by a prosecutor during closing argument should be and are closely
scrutinized. 175
Yet, in addition to protecting the innocent from improper prosecution, a pros-
ecutor is responsible for insuring that people who commit crimes are brought to
justice. 17 6
[T]he prosecutor is forced to operate with one hand on the throttle and the other
hand poised firmly on the brake. His primary duty is to earnestly and vigorously
present the government's case, using every legitimate means to bring about a
conviction. It is not sufficient to convict, however; for if justice has not been
done, his "clients" have been poorly represented. Therefore, the prosecutor's
duty is to convict only the guilty and, moreover, to do so in a manner consistent
with recognized principles of justice. 177
167. See State v. Vigue, 420 A.2d 242, 247 (Me. 1980).
168. See State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1302 (Me. 1981) (trial court in better position to
gauge impact of objectionable conduct).
169. NATIONAL DIST. ATTORNEYS Ass'N, NAT'L PROSECUTOR STANDARDS § 1.1 (2d cd. 1991). See
also State v. Wallace, 1997 ME 51, 5, 691 A.2d 1195, 1197 (noting prosecutor's "duty is not
simply to obtain a conviction but rather to ensure that justice is done").
170. A.B.A. STANDARDS 3-1.2 (3d ed. 1993).
171. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1983).
172. See State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 105 (Me. 1995).
173. State v. Collin, 441 A.2d 693, 697 (Me. 1982).
174. State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me. 1994).
175. See State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d at 105 (Bar Rules governing conduct at trial apply with
"particular force" to prosecutors). See NORMAN DOTSEN & LEON FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE1
COURT: REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMInrI ON
COURTROOM CONDUCT 185 (1973) (comments by defense attorney have little weight compared
with similar statements of the district attorney).
176. A prosecutor, in addition to protecting the innocent, must "prosecute crimes vigorously
and ... ensure public safety." John H. King, Jr., Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Limita-
tions Upon the Prosecutor's Role as an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1095, 1102 (1980).
177. Henry B. Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's Clos-
ing Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 22 (1973).
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The responsibilities of the prosecutor are dual, and they are not always easy to
carry out. Confusion often results when the prosecutorial function is not clearly
defined and prosecutors are left without a coherent understanding of their role.178
The convictions prosecutors seek are pursued within an adversarial system.
In contrast to the English experience, the criminal justice system in the United
States rests upon the supposition that counsel for the prosecution and the defense
function as adversaries umpired by an impartial judge. Although both systems
strive for the truth, the American reliance on an adversary process results in a
dissimilar trial methodology. 179
"The central figure in this system is the partisan advocate.... [I]n a very real
sense it may be said that the integrity of the adjudicative process itself depends on
the participation of the advocate." 180 Complying with the "do justice" mandate is
not easy for prosecutors working within the adversary system. Codes of conduct
do not exempt them from "the requirements of zealous advocacy." 18 1 Reading the
cursory "do justice" language as a denunciation of competitive fact-finding there-
fore would create an internal contradiction.
Prosecutors are subject to the codes of conduct applicable to all attorneys in
our adversarial system.182 That system requires that litigants in criminal matters,
including the State, have competent representation. Good lawyering by a prosecu-
tor makes a conviction more likely.183
"In the adversary system, a defendant's remedy for a vociferous closing argu-
ment by the prosecutor is an effective summation of his own. 184 Indeed, it would
undermine truth-seeking to let defense lawyers stimulate a jury, while confining a
prosecutor to a dry rational recitation of the facts. Juror sympathy is consistent
with adversarial justice so long as that sympathy derives from the evidence." 185
178. See Stanley Z. Fisher, Zealousness and "Over Zealousness": Making Sense of the
Prosecutor's Duty to Seek Justice, THE PROSECU'R, Winter 1989, at 9-10.
179. King, supra note 177, at 1098.
180. Rosemary Nidiry, Note, RestrainingAdversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 CoLum.
L. RE., 1299, 1301-02 (1996). "Presumably, the collection and presentation of favorable infor-
mation by opposing advocates ensures that the trier of fact has access to all the relevant informa-
tion required for a correct decision." Id. at 1301 n.16.
181. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecu-
tors do Justice? 44 VAINa. L. Ray. 45, 52 (1991). See also ME. BAR R. 3.7 (Conduct During
Litigation).
182. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) ("[C]ounsel on both sides share duty to
confine arguments to jury within proper bounds.").
183. Zacharias, supra note 181, at 52.
184. The Law Court has recognized that the nature and vigor of prosecutorial argument may
be affected by the strategy of the defendant. See State v. Weisbrode, 653 A.2d 411, 416 (Me.
1995). Maine has not, however, sanctioned the doctrine of "invited response." See Nidiry.
supra note 164, at 1319.
185. Zacharias, supra note 182, at 98. Some argue for a very different standard to be applied
to prosecutors. For example, legal scholar Albert NV. Alschuler contends that the prosecutor
should be "afforded less leeway than the defense attomey." Albert N1. Alschuler, Courtroom
Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. Rev. 629, 633 (1972). Believing mis-
conduct by prosecutors to be pervasive, he thinks we should emulate the English system and that
prosecutors should strive for more Chesterfieldian politeness. See id. at 636. Alschuler writes
that
if a defense attorney, through emotional appeal, is able to persuade a jury that his
client's conviction would be unfair, there should be no cause for alarm. Although an
occasional conviction not based on the evidence is a terrifying prospect, an occa-
sional "nonevidentiary" acquittal is a tolerable and probably desirable occurrence.
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The "'do justice' rule... forbids ploys resting on sympathy or prejudice, but only
if those emotions are extrajudicial-not rooted in the admissible facts of the
case."
186
"A prosecutor may be zealous. She may advocate, almost to the limits of her
talents. Once the charging and plea bargaining stages are complete, she usually
may act like any trial lawyer acts." 187 Although a prosecutor does have a duty to
"protect the innocent," as an advocate he or she "has the obligation to prosecute
crimes vigorously and to ensure public safety." 188
Whitney Seymour argues that in the adversary system the prosecutor's duty to
"seek justice" applies mainly to the decisions made by the prosecutor regarding
whether a case should be prosecuted, and to the preparation of the case before the
grand jury.18 9 The decision to prosecute, Seymour contends, is "tantamount to
deciding that prosecution 'is how justice will be done."' 190 During a trial, a pros-
ecutor is an advocate. 19 1 Once a decision has been made to prosecute, and in view
of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor must meet to
secure a conviction, the prosecutor should be able to prosecute at trial with zeal
and vigor.192 The Law Court has recognized this view. In State v. Walsh,193 the
prosecutor, in her opening statement, stated "I believe beyond a reasonable doubt
[that the victim] has the right person." 194 In concluding that there was no obvious
error, the court noted the awareness of jurors that "the role of the prosecutor is to
argue for guilt, and might just as well read nothing more into 'I believe' than they
have already read into the decision to prosecute."'195
Judge Learned Hand stressed the importance of allowing the prosecutor the
freedom to argue vigorously to a jury.
Id. at 637. Maine has never taken Professor Alschuler's position that "an occasional
'nonevidentiary' acquittal is a tolerable and probably desirable occurrence." It is clear from its
opinions, however, that the Law Court places a burden on prosecutors to do justice as well as to
seek convictions. See, e.g., State v. Collin, 441 A.2d 693, 697 (Me. 1982) ("As a representative
of an impartial sovereign the prosecutor's duty to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair
trial must far outweigh any desires which may exist to achieve a successful track record of
convictions."); State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Me. 1982) (characterizing State's clos-
ing as "prosecutorial overkill").
186. Zacharias, supra note 181, at 98-99.
187. Id. at 113. A prosecutor, of course, is obligated to call to the attention of the court and
the defendant any exculpatory evidence that comes to his or her attention. See ME. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(2) (stating that "[t]he attorney for the State shall have a continuing duty to disclose [excul-
patory] matters").
188. See King, supra note 176, at 1102.
189. See Whitney Seymour, Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 RFc. Ass'N B. Crry
N.Y., 302,312-13 (1956).
190. Id. As part of their duty to protect the innocent and to do justice, prosecutors are "under
no duty to file charges ... before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791 (1977). See also
Zacharias, supra note 182, at 51 (stating that once the case reaches trial, the prosecutor "already
has made her good faith determination that the defendant is guilty").
191. See Stanley A. Fisher, supra note 178, at 16.
192. See Zacharias, supra note 181, at 52.
193. 558 A.2d 1184 (Me. 1989).
194. Id. at 1187.
195. Id (emphasis added). See also supra note 190.
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While, of course, we recognize that the prosecutor is by custom more rigidly
limited than the defense, we must decline to assimilate its position to that of
either judge or jury, or to confine a prosecuting attorney to an impartial state-
ment of the evidence. He is an advocate, and it is entirely proper for him as
earnestly as he can to persuade the jury of the truth of his side, of which he ought
to be thoroughly convinced before he begins at all. To shear him of all oratorical
emphasis, while leaving wide latitude to defense, is to load the scales of justice;
it is to deny what has always been an accepted incident of jury trials, except in
those jurisdictions where any serious execution of the criminal law has yielded to
a ghostly phantom of the innocent man falsely convicted. 196
Other courts have likewise emphasized the need for prosecutors to argue with
vigor. "[I]f the conduct of the prosecution in argument in this case constitutes
error, then, the prosecution in every case is limited to a listless, vigorless summa-
tion of fact in Chesterfieldian politeness. Gone are the days of the great advocates
whose logic glowed and flowed with the heat of forensics!" 197
There are separate standards of conduct applied to prosecutors and to defense
attorneys. 198 Nevertheless, in the adversary system, the standards governing how
they conduct closing argument at trial are similar, and courts should avoid relying
on differences that do not exist to conclude that prosecutors commit misconduct in
their summation.199 A defense attorney is prohibited from intentionally misstat-
196. DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925).
197. King, supra note 176, at 1106 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d 941,943 (9th
Cir. 1945)).
198. Defense attorneys, for example, are permitted to cross-examine witnesses they know to
be truthful, with a view to testing the State's case. See A.B.A. STANDAanS FOR C1utOJusncs,
4-7.6(b) (1993). Defense attorneys are not subject to the same standard as prosecutors to dis-
close or introduce material evidence adverse to their case. See Fisher, supra note 178. at 12.
199. See A.B.A. SrTwmnns FoR Ciwn AL Jus'nca 3-5.8:
Standard 3-5.8 ARGUMENT TO THE JURY
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable infer-
ences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not intentionally mis-
state the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the
truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defeqdant.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the preju-
dices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from
its duty to decide the case on the evidence.
IL See also ia 4-7.7:
Standard 4-7.7 ARGUMENT TO THE JURY
(a) In closing argument to the jury, defense counsel may argue all reasonable infer-
ences from the evidence in the record. Defense counsel should not intentionally
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) Defense counsel should not express a personal belief or opinion in his or her
client's innocence or personal belief or opinion in the truth or falsity of any testi-
mony or evidence.
(c) Defense counsel should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the preju-
dices of the jury.
(d) Defense counsel should refrain from argument which would divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.
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ing the evidence and misleading the jury as to inferences that may be drawn from
the evidence,200 and from expressing "a personal belief or opinion in his or her
client's innocence or personal belief or opinion in the truth." 2 0 1 Although there
are some differences in the standards and how they apply,202 the commentary to
the ABA Standards notes: "It should be accepted that both prosecutor and defense
counsel are subject to the same general limitations upon the scope of their argu-
ments."
2 03
The Maine Bar Rule applying to "Adversary Conduct" makes no distinction
between prosecutors and criminal defense counsel when it prohibits the assertion
of personal knowledge of the facts at issue, and the assertion of a personal opinion
as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, or the guilt or innocence of
an accused. 204 The same rule allows both prosecutors and defense attorneys to
"argue, on the lawyer's analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion
with respect to the matters stated therein .... ,205 This standard reflects what the
law has always been:
The right of discussing the merits of the cause, both as to the law and the facts, is
unabridged. The range of discussion is wide. [The attorney] may be heard in
argument upon every question of law. In his addresses to the jury, it is his privi-
lege to descant upon the facts proved, or admitted in the pleadings; to arraign the
conduct of the parties; impugn, excuse, justify or condemn motives, so far as
they are developed in evidence, assail the credibility of witnesses, when it is
impeached by direct evidence, or by the inconsistency or incoherence of their
200. See id 4-7.7(a).
201. Id. 4-7.7(b). See also ME. BAR R. 3.7(e)(2)(v).
202. For example, it is improper for the State to disparage a legitimate theory of defense. See
State v. McDonald, 472 A.2d 424, 425-26 (Me. 1984). Likewise, a prosecutor is prohibited
from playing on the fear of jurors. See State v. Pineau, 463 A.2d 779, 780-81 (Me. 1983). See
also MODEL RULES; OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 3.8 (1983).
203. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE PROSECUTIoN 4-7.7 commentary. See also King,
supra note 176, at 1103. The conduct of defense attorneys in criminal cases is rarely reviewed
by appellate courts in direct appeals. But see State v. Bennefield, 567 A.2d 863 (Del. 1989). See
also Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329 (Me. 1978) (reviewing defense attorney conduct in civil
case).
204. Ms. BAR R. 3.7(e)(2) provides:
(e) Adversary Conduct.
(2) In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(ii) State or allude to any matter that the lawyer has no reasonable basis to believe
is relevant to the case or will not be supported by admissible evidence;
(iii) Ask any question that the lawyer has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant
to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other person;
(iv) Assert personal knowledge of the facts at issue, except when testifying as a
witness;
(v) Assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a
witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an
accused; but a lawyer may argue, on the lawyer's analysis of the evidence, for any
position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated therein; or
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testimony, their manner of testifying, their appearance on the stand, or by cir-
cumstances. His illustrations may be as various as the resources of his genius;
his argumentation as full and profound as his learning can make it; and he may, if
he will, give play to his wit, or wings to his imagination. 205
The Law Court's sound 19th century analysis of the duties of the attorneys
during closing argument is consistent with the standard for prosecutors set out in
Berger v. United States.20 7 "As is permitted to the debater in parliamentary con-
tests the legal advocate may employ wit, satire, invective, and imaginative illustra-
tion in his arguments before the jury, both in civil and criminal trials, but in this the
license is strictly confined to the domain of facts in evidence." 20 8
An appellate court must assess the State's closing argument based on the
record.209 The words actually used by the prosecutor are crucial to the legitimacy
of the argument. When the Law Court has vacated convictions based on the State's
closing argument, it has done so because the prosecutors were expressing what the
court considered to be personal opinion on the credibility of witnesses.2 10 Such
expressions of personal opinion are prohibited because they invade the province of
the jury to assess credibility of witnesses, and are particularly off-limits to pros-
ecutors because they speak with the authority of the State and the potential for
improper jury influence is greater.2 11 Thus, the license to employ "wit, satire
[and] invective... is strictly confined to the domain of facts in evidence. ' 2 12
Prosecutors can avoid the perception that they are expressing personal opin-
ion in closing argument by carefully selecting the language they use. It is not
permissible, for example, for the prosecutor to state, "I know that the defendant
lied," or "I know that a witness lied," or "I know that our witness was truthful," or
"I believe witness 'X,"' or "Don't believe witness 'Y,"' or "I know the defendant
is guilty.",2 13 Those are clearly expression of personal opinion that are made with-
out reference to the evidence. Less objectionable, and closer to legitimate argu-
ment are statements such as, "I submit that a witness is not credible," or "I suggest
that our witness is telling the truth." 2 14 Even better would be, "I suggest that the
evidence shows that the defendant's testimony is not believable," or "I submit that
the evidence points to the guilt of the defendant," provided the "suggestion" or
"submission" is supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. Although the use
of strong language such as "liar" may be permissible when the evidence clearly
justifies its use,2 15 the better practice is to avoid the use of pejorative "liar" Ian-
206. Rolfe v. Rumford, 66 Me. 564,567 (1877).
207. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
208. State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 66, 68 A. 454, 455 (1907).
209. See State v. Pelletier, 534 A.2d 970, 972-73 (Me. 1987) (holding that a case must be
decided by the appellate court on record before it). See also State v. Wheeler, 444 A.2d 430,432
(Me. 1982); State v. Gribbin, 360 A.2d 517, 518 (Me. 1976).
210. See, e.g., State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Me. 1994); State v. Casella, 632 A.2d
121, 123 (Me. 1993); State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1983).
211. See State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me. 1994).
212. State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63,66,68 A. 454,455 (1907).
213. See Saltzburg, supra note 11. at 44.
214. See id.
215. See State v. Pendexter, 495 A.2d 1241 (Me. 1985) (holding that it was permissible for
the prosecutor to characterize as a liar and thief a witness who admitted he was a liar and thief).
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guage, taking away an issue for appeal. 2 16 The more the prosecutor refers to the
evidence, and uses language that draws the evidence into the argument, the less
likely the summation will be found to violate acceptable standards.
In State v. Harnish,2 17 the prosecutor, in his closing argument, said that the
defendant "did not tell you the truth," but "reacted with lies.' 2 18 The prosecutor
also talked about the "false statements," "misstatements," and "lies" of the defen-
dant.2 19 The court concluded that the prosecutor's remarks, as strong as they were,
did not constitute an impermissible expression of personal opinion on the credibil-
ity of the defendant. 220 It is important to note, however, that the prosecutor in at
least one of the references to the defendant's credibility, prefaced his remarks with
"I suggest," and that because the defendant admitted at his trial that he had lied, the
argument being made by the prosecutor was connected to the facts in evidence. 2 2 1
The selection of language in the closing argument is within the complete control of
the prosecutor and its judicious use can go a long way toward avoiding serious
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.
C. Role of the Defense Attorney 22
Just as the prosecutor can avoid a charge of misconduct by the careful use of
language, the defense attorney must be alert to such misconduct when it occurs so
that it can be objected to and called to the attention of the trial court. The defen-
dant is obligated to make timely objections to improper closing arguments. 223 A
proper objection calls the trial court's attention to the offending conduct and gives
the court the opportunity to take corrective action. 224 Proper objection
allows the trial justice to correct errors and reduce prejudice, thus serving the
interests of promptness and accuracy in the administration of justice. Without a
specification of the grounds for objection or a request for a curative instruction
on the record, an appellate court may conclude that counsel made a tactical deci-
sion to waive his objection. 22
216. Moreover, sharp attacks on the character of the defendant or witnesses for the defendant
are generally thought not to be effective. See RoBERr E. KE aoN, TRIAL TAcnCS AND MEntODS §
7.19, at 293 (2d ed. 1973).
217. 560 A.2d 5 (Me. 1989).
218. Id. at 9.
219. ld
220. See id at 9-10. The court also examined the prosecutor's closing argument in the
context of the evidence.
221. See id
222. Although the conduct of a defense attorney in arguing to a jury is not frequently re-
viewed by an appellate court on appeal, see supra note 203, defense attorneys are, nevertheless,
bound by the same standards of conduct as prosecutors in conducting closing argument; they are
prohibited from usurping the factfinding function of the jury and from diverting the attention of
the jury away from the evidence. See supra pages 243-45 (discussing rationale for rules govern-
ing conduct of attorneys in closing argument); ME. BAR R. 3.7(e)(2)(v); see supra note 199.
Moreover, their conduct may affect what the prosecutor is allowed to do.
223. See State v. Watson, 63 Me. 128, 138 (1873). See Ma- R. CF]M. P. 30(b), 51, 52(b).
224. See State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 66, 68 A. 454,455 (1907) (objection allowed trial court
to interrupt objectionable closing and to give curative instruction, thus eliminating prejudice).
See also State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231,237 (Me. 1994).
225. State v. Vigue, 420 A.2d 242, 247 (Me. 1980).
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In State v. Terrio,2 26 the defendant's counsel failed to object to a clearly improper
closing argument and even refused a curative instruction suggested by the trial
court. On appeal, the Law Court concluded that the defendant would be required
to live with his choice of seeking a verdict from the jury rather than accepting a
mistrial and possibly a new trial.227 The failure to object to an impermissible
closing argument will limit any review on appeal to one of obvious error.228 Need-
less to say, it is not an easy task to persuade an appellate court that an error is "so
highly prejudicial that it taints the proceedings and virtually deprives the defen-
dant of a fair trial. ' 22 9 It is not frequently done.230
D. Role of the Trial Court
An appellate court has an important function in establishing standards for pros-
ecutors in closing arguments. The role of the trial court, however, in controlling
prosecutorial misconduct and in lessening the impact of improper conduct is cru-
cial. The trial court should take prompt action to deal with any improper action by
any attorney.2 3 1 "IT]he Judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the
trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct. 2 32 Prompt action from the
bench in the form of corrective instructions and admonitions to the attorneys can
be very beneficial and discourage improper behavior.233
The importance of the role of the trial court in controlling and lessening the
impact of prosecutorial misconduct has been emphasized many times in Maine
case law. For example, in State v. Burgoyne,2 34 the court's prompt and appropriate
curative instructions overcame the State's improper efforts to play on the jury's
sympathy during closing argument.235 In State v. Griatzky,2 3 6 the Law Court con-
226. 442 A.2d 537 (Me. 1982).
227. See id. at 543. See also State v. Conner, 434 A.2d 509, 511 (Me. 198 1) (stating that the
defendant acquiesced in a curative instruction prompted by State's closing argument when de-
fendant did not request mistrial and did not argue it would be impossible for jury to disregard
such argument).
228. See State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231, 237 & n.4 (Me. 1984) (stating that a defendant's
choice not to seek mistrial may be tactical decision to seek a verdict rather than accept mistrial);
see also United States v. Thierman, No. 94-10279, 1996 WL 18638. at *3 (9th Cir. 1996) (point-
ing out importance of defense raising objection to improper argument); State s- Harnish, 560
A.2d 5, 10 (Me. 1989) (defense counsel failed to seek curative instruction, court did not give
curative instruction).
229. State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me. 1994) (citing State v. True, 438 A.2d 460.468 (Me.
1981)).
230. See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 94 (Me. 1986) (stating that "the appellate court must
be reluctant to reverse ajudgment on the basis of an error not brought to the attention of the trial
court").
231. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
232. /L at 10 (quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466,469 (1933)).
233. See idL at 13. See also United States v. Thierman, 1996 WIL 18638, at 03 (9th Cir. 1996)
(the personal attacks should have been stopped at once by the trial court). The responsibility of
the trial court to control the actions of the attorneys, however, does not absolve the attorneys of
their responsibilities to conduct themselves in accordance with the appropriate standards of
conduct. See State v. Cotton, 673 A.2d 1317, 1319 (Me. 1996) (reciting prosecutor's improper
statement that trial judge is "supposed to pay attention, know what he's doing, know when I'm
crossing the line").
234. 452 A.2d 393 (1982).
235. See id at 396.
236. 587 A.2d 234 (Me. 1991).
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cluded that the trial court's chastisement of the prosecutor for improper comments
on witness credibility during closing argument, and its instructions to the jury to
disregard the improper remarks "easily precluded any need for a new trial."'237 In
State v. MacLean,23 8 the prosecutor commented in closing argument that the de-
fendant had been drinking all day, a statement that was not based on the evidence.
The prejudice was cured, however, by the trial court's instruction to the jury that it
was their recollection, not the State's closing argument, that controlled their deter-
mination of the facts. 239 "Only when there are exceptionally prejudicial circum-
stances or prosecutorial bad faith will a curative instruction be deemed inadequate
to eliminate the prejudice." 240 Damage caused by very egregious conduct of the
prosecutor is more likely to be cured by prompt and appropriate curative instruc-
tions, if those instructions are "specifically addressed to the prosecutor's miscon-
duct."' 24 1 Although an instruction to the jury that the opening and closing state-
ments of the attorneys do not constitute evidence should always be given,2 4 2 such
237. Id. at 236.
238. 560 A.2d 1088 (Me. 1989).
239. See id. at 1091. See also State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231,237 (Me. 1984) (curative instruc-
tion can preserve fair trial for defendant); Vess, supra note 177, at 53-54.
240. State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1302 (Me. 1981) (trial court in better position to gauge
impact of objectionable conduct). In not all cases, however, can a curative instruction cure the
prejudice resulting from improper closing argument. In State v. Bujnowski, 532 A.2d 1385
(N.H. 1987), the defense objected to the prosecutor's statement in his closing argument that "I
think for ninety-percent of it [the witness] was lying. I think she's here to protect her husband."
I& at 1386. Before resuming his closing he issued a retraction to the jury and said that he had
made a mistake in expressing his personal opinion. He proceeded to state to the jury, however,
that "I think [the defendant is guilty]." Id.
After the State concluded its closing argument, the trial court denied the defendant's motion
for a mistrial, then gave the jury a specific instruction to "ignore what [the prosecutor] said was
his personal opinion, as he himself has also asked that you ignore." See id.
Noting that curative instructions "normally" can negate misconduct, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court nonetheless vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, stating: "In
this case such intentional, repetitive misconduct may well have rendered the court's curative
instructions meaningless." Id. at 1388.
See also State v. Stith, 856 P.2d 415 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (prosecutor's flagrant personal
assurances to the jury as to the defendant's guilt, because such comments strike at the very heart
of a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, could not be cured). It is not
common, however, for a closing argument that cannot be cured by a corrective instruction to be
the subject of appellate review because the trial court will likely grant a mistrial based on such a
closing. One commentator has suggested that the standard is similar to the obvious error stan-
dard. See Vess, supra note 177, at 53.
241. See State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1129 (Me. 1982).
242. See DONALD G. ALEXANDER, MAINE JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL § 5-8, Instruction 12 (3d
ed. 1996).
§ 5-8. Instruction 12-Closing Argument.
Members of the jury. The evidence is completed. We are ready to proceed to closing
argument. The purpose of closing argument is for counsel to discuss the evidence and
points of law which they believe are most significant for your consideration. I would
emphasize, however, that argument is not evidence. You are going to decide the case
based on the evidence. The evidence is the sworn testimony of the witnesses and the
exhibits offered and admitted into evidence at trial. Counsel's arguments are legiti-
mate efforts to guide your consideration of the evidence. If during the course of
argument, counsel's recollection on some point of evidence differs from your own, it
will be your recollection of the eviilence that is important. Id. (emphasis added).
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an instruction given by the court in routine fashion, and not given for the purpose
of curing what the defendant or the trial court perceives as an improper closing
argument, is less likely to be considered sufficient to overcome impermissible state-
ments during summation.243 The conviction in Casella may well have been af-
firmed if the trial court had directed an instruction to thejury in response to Casella's
objection to the State's closing argument, and again reminded them that the clos-
ing statements of the attorneys do not constitute evidence, and that the jury must
determine the facts based on the evidence as they perceive it.
In hindsight as the trial judge in State v. Smith, 244 I can say that I could have
taken action in the form of an instruction to the jury in response to Smith's objec-
tion prior to the jury's retiring to begin deliberations that would have focused the
attention of the jury on the fact that the arguments by counsel are not evidence, and
that it is the jury's own view of the evidence on which they should base their
decision.245 It is important to remind jurors in all cases that closing arguments are
not evidence, but particularly important to give special emphasis to that instruc-
tion when attorneys stray at all from arguing the facts based on the evidence, and
begin to state what could be characterized as personal opinion.
VL CONCLUSION
Although appeals to the Law Court based on allegations of prosecutorial mis-
conduct in the closing argument have not frequently succeeded, direct comments
by prosecutors on the credibility of the defendant or of witnesses, and in particular
when pejorative language such as "liar" has been used, have been closely scruti-
nized.246 The outcome of those appeals have generally depended on whether those
comments are connected to and based on the evidence. It is the province of the
jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, and prosecutors, even though they
are governed in their closing argument by standards no different from those apply-
ing to attorneys for the defense, because they speak for the State, are subjected to
closer scrutiny and are not permitted to express personal opinions on that credibil-
ity.2 47 Prosecutors are permitted, however, to argue "for any position or conclu-
sion" stated in the evidence,2 48 and to employ "wit, satire [and] invective" in argu-
ing for that position or conclusion, provided it is grounded in the evidence.24 9
In considering allegations of an improper closing argument on appeal, the
Law Court must review the language used in the context of the entire case,25 0 and
determine whether the prosecutor's comments are "fairly based on the facts in the
243. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 124 (Me. 1993) (Rudman, I., dissenting) (reference
to court's routine instruction to the jury).
244. 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983). See supra discussion of State %t Smith at pp. 250-51, and note
88.
245. See At.xAER, supra note 243, at § 5-8, Instruction 12 and § 6-10, Instruction 21.
246. See, e.g., State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Me. 1994); State v. Casella, 632 A.2d
121, 123 (Me. 1993); State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1983); see also State v. Reilly, 446
A.2d 1125, 1129 n.2 (Me. 1982).
247. See State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 10 (Me. 1994); State v. Smith, 456 A.2d at 17.
248. Ma. BARR. 3.7(e)(2)(v).
249. See State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 66 (1907).
250. See State v. Moontri, 649 A.2d 315, 317 (Me. 1994).
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evidence. ' 25 1 It is primarily at the trial court, however, where improper closing
argument can be avoided and corrected. By carefully choosing language and con-
necting their comments to the evidence, prosecutors can almost always avoid charges
of misconduct in closing argument. 252 Defense attorneys should be alert to call
impermissible argument to the attention of the trial court.253 The trial court, through
the use of admonishment and curative instructions, and even the threat of declar-
ing a mistrial, can prevent and cure most improper argument by prosecutors. 2 54
251. State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, 22, 697 A.2d 73, 80; State v. Hoffstadt, 652 A.2d 93,
96 (Me. 1995).
252. See Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 44.
253. See State v. Watson, 63 Me. 128, 138 (1873).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9-10, 13 (1985); State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d
1125, 1129 (Me. 1982); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1302 (Me. 1981).
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